Current News Stories

The British Standards Institution, the Department of Health and the National Patient Safety Agency are jointly developing PAS 5748, Specification for cleanliness in healthcare facilities and hospitals. The Publicly Available Standard is due to be published in March 2010 and is designed to assist in the provision of cleanliness in support of infection prevention and improved patient, public and staff confidence. PAS 5748 will specify requirements for the provision of cleanliness in acute, community and mental health hospitals. There will be requirements that include:

• Definition and assigning of cleanliness responsibilities and accountabilities.
• Risk assessment and categorisation of functional areas and elements within hospitals.
• Identification and implementation of cleaning tasks needed to achieve a specified definition of the word 'clean' for different elements within hospitals.
• The measurement, reporting and improvement of cleanliness.

PAS 5748 is intended to be endorsed at board level and implemented by those employed to maintain cleanliness in hospitals, including dedicated cleaning staff, nursing and departmental staff and facilities management staff.

Although initially intended to be used within acute, community and mental health hospitals across the NHS in England, it will be developed in such a way as to permit wider application in future editions.

The Health and Safety Executive has published Consultative Document CD228, Consultation on Amendments to the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 and the Health and Safety (Fees) Regulations. It deals with proposed amendments to the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 (PSR), which provide for the management of pipeline safety and apply to all pipelines in Great Britain and to all pipelines in UK territorial waters and on the UK Continental Shelf. It also outlines the amendments the HSE intend to make to the Health and Safety (Fees) Regulations.

The proposed amendments include: the classification of gasoline and carbon dioxide as dangerous fluids under PSR; the introduction of an expiry date on notifications made under Regulation 21; an amendment to Regulation 23 which will cover the situation where a larger company is broken up, resulting in multiple ownership; the introduction of a duty on the local authority to implement their emergency pipeline plan without delay, under Regulation 29; and the introduction of a duty on the operator to notify the local authority and emergency services in the circumstances specified in Regulation 29, under Regulation 26.

The consultation document can be accessed at:

http://consultations.hse.gov.uk/inovem/gf2.ti/f/10562/297829.1/pdf/-/cd228.pdf

The Process Safety Leadership Group (PSLG) is a joint industry and regulators group that was set up in September 2007 to drive forward high standards in process safety leadership and to complete the implementation of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) recommendations. It comprises representatives of the United Kingdom Petroleum Industries Association; the Tank Storage Association; the United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators Association; the Chemical Industries Association; the trade union Unite; the Environment Agency; the Scottish Environment Protection Agency; and the Health and Safety Executive.

The aim of the PSLG was to meet the need for an effective framework for interaction between industry, trade unions and the Competent Authority; and a framework in which they could carry out a dialogue to jointly develop, progress and implement meaningful, effective recommendations and practices that improve industrial safety.

On 11th December 2009, the PSLG published its final report, which is based on the improvements developed by the Buncefield Standards Task Group, and provides full and comprehensive guidance in addressing all 25 recommendations of the MIIB report on the design and operation of fuel storage sites. The document, Safety and Environmental Standards for Fuel Storage Sites, can be downloaded from:

http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/fuel-storage-sites.pdf

In connection with the Buncefield incident, criminal proceedings have been commenced against Total UK Ltd, Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd, British Pipeline Agency Ltd, TAV Engineering Ltd, and Motherwell Control Systems 2003 Ltd, following a thorough and complex criminal investigation conducted by the HSE and the Environment Agency.

Following an explosion and fire on 19th July 2009 at the CITGO Corpus Christi refinery in Texas, the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) issued urgent safety recommendations to CITGO in December 2009, calling on the company to improve immediately its emergency water mitigation system in the event of another release of potentially deadly hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapour. The CSB also called on CITGO to perform third-party audits to ensure the safety of its hydrogen fluoride units at its Corpus Christi, Texas, and Lemont, Illinois, refineries. The CSB issues such urgent recommendations before completion of its final investigation reports in cases where it identifies the presence of an imminent hazard with the potential to cause serious harm unless rectified immediately.

During the July incident, hydrocarbons and hydrogen fluoride were released suddenly from the HF alkylation unit at the refinery. The hydrocarbons ignited, leading to a fire that burned for several days. One employee was critically injured and another was treated for hydrogen fluoride exposure.

The CSB investigators found that a blockage of liquid caused by the sudden failure of a control valve led to violent shaking within the process recycle piping. The shaking broke threaded pipe connections, resulting in the release of hydrocarbons. The cloud of hydrocarbons reached an adjacent unit and ignited. The ensuing fire caused multiple additional fires and the release of approximately 20,000 kg of hydrogen fluoride from equipment and piping within the unit.

The refinery used a water spray system to absorb the released HF, but the CSB calculated that at least 2,000 kg of HF escaped from the unit into the atmosphere and left the facility. The incident nearly exhausted the refinery stored water supply for the water mitigation system. CITGO began pumping salt water from a nearby ship channel to the refinery fire water supply, but multiple failures took place during the salt water transfer, including ruptures of the barge-to-shore transfer hoses and water pump engine failures.

The CSB was critical of the quality of emergency response resources available to control a release of hazardous materials and protect against impact on the surrounding community. CITGO is required to develop and initiate plans within 30 days to ensure an adequate water supply to the refinery HF mitigation system. The company should also report planned or completed actions to the Refinery Terminal Fire Company and the Local Emergency Planning Committee every 30 days until all planned activities are fully implemented.

The CSB also found that no independent, third-party safety audits had been conducted on CITGO's two HF alkylation units at its refineries in Corpus Christi and Lemont, despite an existing industry recommendation for audits every three years. The CSB said that the audits must be undertaken and should compare safety practices at the alkylation units to those recommended by the American Petroleum Institute.

The Aeon-Jusco Shopping Complex in Jalan Lagenda, Bachang, Malacca, is an RM300 million project about to be opened for business. On 14th December 2009, as gas supply pipelines were being tested, an explosion took place that killed one contract worker, critically injured six and left more than a dozen with lesser injuries.

The State Fire and Rescue Department said the explosion was believed to have been caused by a leakage in one of the pipes supplying liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to outlets in the food and beverage court of the shopping complex, which has a centralised LPG system. The building precinct, which covers 18,600 square metres of commercial space, underwent a partial collapse in the blast.

Since it is a large public building expected to receive many shoppers when open, the Department of Occupational Safety and Health is undertaking an investigation.

Engineered geothermal systems technology is a methodology for tapping energy from heat sources located below ground. Engineers drill wells and pump water into hot rocks to create steam, which is then extracted to power a turbine that generates electricity. Sometimes hydraulic fracturing of a reservoir at depth is necessary; and sometimes artificially injecting water into fractured rock may have unforeseen consequences.

On 15th December 2009, the director of a geothermal energy company went on trial before a court in Switzerland accused of damaging property by triggering earthquakes. The former oilman had been undertaking a joint renewable energy project with the authorities in the Petit-Huningue area of the medieval city of Basel, an area known to be seismically active. A well had been drilled to a depth of five kilometres near the corner of Neuhaus Street and Shafer Lane. On 8th December 2006, the work triggered several earthquakes of magnitude around 3.4 that shook and damaged buildings and terrified inhabitants. By chance the incident caused no injuries, but resulted in $9 million of property damage.

The project was immediately suspended and later banned. Subsequent studies by Swiss Government geologists concluded that if the project had been allowed to continue there would have been a 15% chance of it triggering an earthquake powerful enough to cause damage of up to $500 million. However, the report found that the project was unlikely to activate the major fault complex that runs deep beneath Basel, movement of which devastated the city in the year 1356 and sent two steeples of the Münster Cathedral falling into the River Rhine.

The accused faces up to five years in jail if found guilty.